

The background of the slide features a faint, light blue image of classical architectural columns, likely from a university building, set against a light blue gradient. The columns are positioned on the left side of the slide, with their capitals and fluted shafts visible.

# **The (in)visible Ukrainian factor in selected EU Member States' approaches to migration**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### Current Ukrainian migration landscape

- Ukraine is currently situated among the **top migrant-sending countries** in the world, with appr. **one fifth** of working-age Ukrainians working abroad, and forecasted **1-2 million** Ukrainians to reside **in the EU by 2050** (Duvell, 2007; IOM, 2008; Kubal, 2012; Vollmer, Bilan, Lapshyna, & Vdovtsova, 2010; Strielkowski & Sanderson, 2013; Cajka, Jarosiewicz, & Strielkowski, 2014, cited in: Mol et al., 2017: 3).
- Two main regions of the outward migration are the Russian Federation and the EU, where their main entry country is **Poland** and main reason – **employment** (Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016 : 4).
- In 2013 the number of trips to (IOM, 2016 : 10), and in 2015 number of residence permits given to Ukrainians in Poland **outnumbered** that in the Russian Federation (Lendel, 2016 : 556).

## Current Ukrainian migration landscape (con-d)

- Based on Ukrainian and foreign scholarship on Ukraine's traditional division of outward migration from it into four "waves" (Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016 : 2,3; Bilan, 2017 : 247-253; IOM, 2016 : 17), I argue, that post-Maidan migration from Ukraine represents a substantially new, **fifth "wave"**,
- in which **two most important new factors, which had been anticipated** to influence the outward migration from Ukraine have been
  - (1) **partial abolition of the visa requirement for Ukrainian citizens in the EU, and**
  - (2) **Russian aggression** against Ukraine on Donbas, occupation of Crimea **and mass internal displacement** caused by it (IOM, 2016 : 5; a number of CES/OSW im. M. Karpia analyses on Ukraine; Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016 : 2; Bilan, 2017: 256-257 in part.; Lendel, 2016 : 552 et seq. speak about either one or both of these two factors).

## II. WHAT HAS CHANGED POST-MAIDAN

### ❑ Mass internal displacement in Ukraine

- its roots and causes;
- internal structure of Ukrainian IDPs;
- institutional and legal framework, state obligations and the extent of state aid available to them.

### ❑ Appearance of the Ukrainian asylum-seekers and externalization of internal migration in Ukraine

### Evaluation of the factors influencing Ukrainian migration to the EU:

- pre-migration (migration aspirations and intentions) and post-migration;
- external and internal;
- macro-, meso-, and micro level factors (based mostly on the study of C.V. Mol, E. Snel, K. Hemmerechts, C. Timmerman on migration aspirations and migration cultures of Ukrainian migrants towards the EU, research article with results published in 2017; Lendel, 2016; own findings)

### III. VISA-FREE REGIME AND EXTERNALIZATION OF INTERNAL MIGRATION FROM UKRAINE TO THE EU:

expectations, reality, possible explanations


#### A. Poland

- Changes in migration from Ukraine in the documents of Office for Foreigners (UdsC), Refugee Board (RdsU) and Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW im. M. Karpia)
- Possible factor(s) influencing the selection of the migration strategy by migrants

#### B. Austria and France

- Joint fact-finding mission of the Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA) and French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) to Ukraine in 2016
- Practical implications of the fact-finding mission





**Thank you for your attention  
and interest in the matter**

**Questions & Answers time**